Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92782
Authors: 
Aoyagi, Masaki
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 580
Abstract: 
This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents' effort incentive through the use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents' expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.
Subjects: 
tournament
mechanism
information revelation
Jensen's inequality
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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