Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92773
Authors: 
Asano, Takao
Matsushima, Noriaki
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 862
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology support the Porter hypothesis, which states that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.
Subjects: 
Environmental regulation
Technology transfer
International competition
Duopoly
JEL: 
Q56
F18
H23
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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