ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 595
This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear income and inheritance taxation by incorporating two types of models that were developed independently in the public finance literature: an infinite horizon representative agent model such as Judd (1995), Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1992), and asymmetric information model analyzed by Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1982). In this paper, by using an infinite horizon model with heterogenous agents and quasi-linear preference under an asymmetric information environment we characterize optimal income and inheritance taxation. This paper shows that, contrary to the general perception that inheritance taxation should be progressive to some extent, the expected tax liability of those who have a higher level of assets is lower than the expected tax liability of those who have a lower level of assets. Thus, the optimal inheritance tax is regressive.
capital income taxation heterogenous agents redistribution inheritance taxation