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Autor:innen: 
Horioka, Charles Yuji
Sekita, Shizuka
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 764
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of better judicial enforcement on the probability of being credit rationed, loan size, and the probability of bankruptcy using household-level data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, in conjunction with judicial data by court district on trial length and the ratio of the number of pending civil trials to the number of incoming civil trials. Contrary to the predictions of the existing theory, we find that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being credit rationed and decreases loan size. Furthermore, we find that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy, a result that is consistent with lax screening effects.
Schlagwörter: 
Judicial enforcement
Credit allocation
Credit rationing
Bankruptcy
Screening
Household Behavior
Borrowing
JEL: 
D12
G21
G33
K12
K41
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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