Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92758
Authors: 
Horioka, Charles Yuji
Sekita, Shizuka
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 764
Abstract: 
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of better judicial enforcement on the probability of being credit rationed, loan size, and the probability of bankruptcy using household-level data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, in conjunction with judicial data by court district on trial length and the ratio of the number of pending civil trials to the number of incoming civil trials. Contrary to the predictions of the existing theory, we find that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being credit rationed and decreases loan size. Furthermore, we find that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy, a result that is consistent with lax screening effects.
Subjects: 
Judicial enforcement
Credit allocation
Credit rationing
Bankruptcy
Screening
Household Behavior
Borrowing
JEL: 
D12
G21
G33
K12
K41
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
543.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.