Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92731
Authors: 
Hatsumi, Kentaro
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 736
Abstract: 
If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that merely by the effect of seed money to shift the threshold requirement of the donations for project success downwards, the proportion of donors and the total amount of donations strictly and continuously increase with the amount of seed money. This result is compatible with the field experimental evidence in List and Lucking-Reiley [List, J. A., Lucking-Reiley, D., 2002. The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110 (1), 215-233].
Subjects: 
charity
seed money
global game
coordination game
excludable threshold public good
JEL: 
C72
D82
H41
L31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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