Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92722
Authors: 
Aoyagi, Masaki
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 794
Abstract: 
This paper studies the problem of a monopolist who sells a network good through a price posting scheme. The scheme posts a price of every possible allocation for each buyer, who are then asked to report their private information to the seller. The seller then implements the allocation based on the reports. The social choice functions that are ex post implementable through such a sales scheme are characterized, and the conditions are identified under which the revenue maximizing scheme has the property that the price of a larger network is more affordable than that of a smaller network.
Subjects: 
network externalities
ex post equilibrium
revenue maximization
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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