Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92713 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 652
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
Schlagwörter: 
marriage problem
G-weak core
G-strong core
JEL: 
C71
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
135.23 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.