Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92713
Authors: 
Takamiya, Koji
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 652
Abstract: 
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
Subjects: 
marriage problem
G-weak core
G-strong core
JEL: 
C71
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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