Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92701 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 891
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals' rent extracting due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the cost-reduction effort level for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the efficiency of the cost-reduction effort varies by much and the healthcare payment cost is large, or if there exist many private hospitals, the insurer can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
Schlagwörter: 
patient dumping
healthcare payment policy
adverse selection
JEL: 
I13
I18
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
457.02 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.