Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92687
Authors: 
Miyagiwa, Kaz
Ohno, Yuka
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 718
Abstract: 
We present a new model of dynamic Bertrand competition, where a quota is treated as an intertemporal constraint rather than as a capacity constraint as is common in the literature. The firm under a quota then can still vary the rates of exports over time provided that its total sales within the period do not exceed the quota. We show that a quota results in higher prices than a tariff of equal imports. We also show that firms never play mixed strategies, which contrasts from the result from a one-shot game, in which the only equilibrium under a quota is in mixed strategies.
Subjects: 
dynamic Bertrand competition
quotas
tariffs
differential game
JEL: 
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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