Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92678
Authors: 
Ishikawa, Jota
Miyagiwa, Kaz
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 693
Abstract: 
Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favor of VERs and price undertakings. We compare foreign firms' incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) under a VER and a price undertaking, with special emphasis on foreign rivalry. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. Thus, the importing country can increase the level of protection by replacing an AD duty with a VER. This may account for the GATT ban on VERs, given the proliferation of AD cases during the 1990s.
Subjects: 
FDI
price undertakings
antidumping
VER
WTO
JEL: 
F1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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