Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92677 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 769
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.
Schlagwörter: 
strategy-proofness
several infinitely divisible commodities
uniform rule
separable preferences
JEL: 
C72
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
287.32 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.