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Mizukami, Hideki
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 672
We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation. We also prove that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions.
Restricted Monotonicity
Direct Revelation Mechanisms
Nash Implementation
Truthful Implementation
Secure Implementation
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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