Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92658
Authors: 
Mizukami, Hideki
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 672
Abstract: 
We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation. We also prove that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions.
Subjects: 
Restricted Monotonicity
Direct Revelation Mechanisms
Nash Implementation
Truthful Implementation
Secure Implementation
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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