Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92656 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 669
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.
Schlagwörter: 
Augmented Revelation Mechanism
Strategy-Proofness
Balancedness
Quasi-Strong-Non-Bossiness
The Revelation Principle
JEL: 
D51
C72
D71
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
198.55 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.