Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92654
Authors: 
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.
Crawford, Vincent P.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 613
Abstract: 
This paper reports experiments that elicit subjects' initial responses to 16 dominancesolvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access, game by game, through an interface that records their information searches. Varying the parameters allows strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules and makes monitoring search a powerful tool for studying cognition. Many subjects' decisions and searches show clearly that they understand the games and seek to maximize their payoffs, but have boundedly rational models of others' decisions, which lead to systematic deviations from equilibrium.
Subjects: 
noncooperative games
experimental economics
guessing games
bounded rationality
strategic sophistication
cognition
information search
JEL: 
C72
C92
C51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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