Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92650 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 792
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.
Schlagwörter: 
airline
airport
privatization
international competition
vertical relations
JEL: 
L33
L13
R48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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