Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92650
Authors: 
Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 792
Abstract: 
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.
Subjects: 
airline
airport
privatization
international competition
vertical relations
JEL: 
L33
L13
R48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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