Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92645
Authors: 
Kitahara, Minoru
Ogawa, Ryo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 781
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction without handicaps. The paper also discusses the allocation rule implemented in the equilibrium and provides a comparison of revenue.
Subjects: 
asymmetric auctions
all-pay auctions
handicap auctions
JEL: 
D44
D82
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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