Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92637
Authors: 
Aoyagi, Masaki
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 566
Abstract: 
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.
Subjects: 
collusion
auction
communication
folk theorem
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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