Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92627
Authors: 
Hatsumi, Kantaro
Berga, Dolors
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 809
Abstract: 
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.
Subjects: 
social choice
public decision making
voting by committees
generalized median voter scheme
separable preference
JEL: 
C72
D71
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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