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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 830
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the questions of who participates in the provision of a public good through the voluntary participation of agents in the presence of strong complementarity between a public good and a private good. We show that the greater the initial endowment of the private good that agents have, the more likely they are to participate in the provision of the public good. Whether an agent participates does not depend on the efficiency of his/her technology for production of the public good. We extend the basic model and introduce a simple transfer game. We show a sufficient condition so that the voluntary transfer scheme achieves Pareto efficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
public goods
voluntary participation
strong complementarity
transfer of private goods
JEL: 
C72
H41
L17
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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