Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92625
Authors: 
Matsushima, Noriaki
Shinohara, Ryusuke
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 830
Abstract: 
This paper examines the questions of who participates in the provision of a public good through the voluntary participation of agents in the presence of strong complementarity between a public good and a private good. We show that the greater the initial endowment of the private good that agents have, the more likely they are to participate in the provision of the public good. Whether an agent participates does not depend on the efficiency of his/her technology for production of the public good. We extend the basic model and introduce a simple transfer game. We show a sufficient condition so that the voluntary transfer scheme achieves Pareto efficiency.
Subjects: 
public goods
voluntary participation
strong complementarity
transfer of private goods
JEL: 
C72
H41
L17
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
187.59 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.