Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92623 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 614
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expectations about their opponent's behavior. In our laboratory experiments, subjects play a set of 14 two-person 3x3 games, and state first order beliefs about their opponent's behavior. The sets of responses in the two tasks are largely inconsistent. Rather, we find evidence that the subjects perceive the games differently when they (i) choose actions, and (ii) state beliefs - they appear to pay more attention to the opponent's incentives when they state beliefs than when they play the games. On average, they fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost half of the games. The inconsistency is confirmed by estimates of a unified statistical model that jointly uses the actions and the belief statements. There, we can control for noise, and formulate a statistical test that rejects consistency. Effects of the belief elicitation procedure on subsequent actions are mostly insignificant.
Schlagwörter: 
noncooperative games
experimental economics
beliefs
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
C92
C51
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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