Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92613
Authors: 
Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 699
Abstract: 
This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.
Subjects: 
Secure implementation
Dominant strategy implementation
Nash implementation
Indivisible goods
Strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C72
C78
D61
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
114.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.