Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92610
Authors: 
Mizobuchi, Hideyuki
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 628
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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