Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92595 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 884
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For a generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately linear in the size of consumption, we identify the classes of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.
Schlagwörter: 
graphs
networks
externalities
Bertrand
divide and conquer
discriminatory pricing
monopolization
segmentation
JEL: 
C72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
250.27 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.