Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92570 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 755
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger, the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input units. The results are related to a visible difference between the vertical structures of Japanese and US auto assemblers.
Schlagwörter: 
Multiple inputs
Bargaining
Disintegration
Double marginalization
JEL: 
L13
L22
M11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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