Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92570
Authors: 
Matsushima, Noriaki
Mizuno, Tomomichi
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 755
Abstract: 
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger, the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input units. The results are related to a visible difference between the vertical structures of Japanese and US auto assemblers.
Subjects: 
Multiple inputs
Bargaining
Disintegration
Double marginalization
JEL: 
L13
L22
M11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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