Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92563
Authors: 
Okudaira, Hiroko
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 733
The ISER-Moriguchi Prize Awarded Paper 11
Abstract: 
The goal of this paper is to detect the degree to which court decisions control the stringency of employment protection and to investigate how such judicial discretion affects labor market performance. However, identification difficulty arises because court decisions are volatile against economic and social conditions. This paper overcomes the endogeneity problem by exploiting the triennial judge transfer system in Japan, or the exogenous allocation of judges to prefectures. A key finding is that the prefecture employment rate is reduced by approximately 1.4% if a prefecture receives more pro-worker judgments than pro-employer ones in a given year.
Subjects: 
Employment Protection
Wrongful-Discharge Law
Weak Instrumental Variables
JEL: 
J65
K31
K41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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