Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92478
Authors: 
Pavan, Alessandro
Jullien, Bruno
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CSIO Working Paper 0119
Abstract: 
We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.
Subjects: 
two-sided markets
dispersed information
platform competition
global-games
informative advertising
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
334.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.