Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92394
Authors: 
Kushnir, Alexey
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 129
Abstract: 
We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates at least the same social surplus. In addition, if there is a social alternative that is inferior to the other alternatives for all agents the dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism matches exactly the social surplus. These results extend to environments with interdependent values satisfying the single crossing condition.
Subjects: 
mechanism design
Bayesian implementation
dominant strategy implementation
full surplus extraction
correlation
JEL: 
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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