Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92368
Authors: 
Brown, Alessio J. G.
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1906
Abstract: 
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.
Subjects: 
minimum wage
labor market
employment
unemployment
job offer
job acceptance
JEL: 
J3
J6
J2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
221.06 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.