Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/91591
Authors: 
Benndorf, Volker
Kübler, Dorothea
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2013-040
Abstract: 
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payo , it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion.
Subjects: 
information revelation
privacy
lemons market
level-k reasoning
quantal response equilibrium
inequality aversion
JEL: 
C72
C90
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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