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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 13/1998
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
In many regulated industries labour uions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on the regime under which the firm is regulated, allowing for endogenously determined wages has ambiguous effects on the regulatory contract.
Schlagwörter: 
wages
bargaining
regulation
JEL: 
J3
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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