Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90789
Authors: 
Strand, J.
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 22/1998
Abstract: 
We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) with the matching-bargaining models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP). Firms and workers form pairwise matches, workers may shirk on the job, and the wage is set in an asymmetric Nash bargain over the surplus created by nonshirking. The wage is then always higher, and employment lower, than in both the corresponding Shapiro=Stiglitz and DMP models.
Subjects: 
wages
bargaining
efficiency
wages
labour market
JEL: 
J31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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