Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90683
Authors: 
Schuknecht, Ludger
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
WTO Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-06
Abstract: 
The paper studies empirically the fiscal policy instruments by which governments try to influence election outcomes in 24 developing countries for the 1973-1992 period. The study finds that the main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around elections is increasing public expenditure rather than lowering taxes, and public investment cycles seem particularly prominent. Institutional mechanisms which constrain discretionary expenditure policies and which strengthen fiscal control are therefore worthwhile considering to prevent opportunistic policy making around elections.
Subjects: 
Elections
political business cycles
fiscal policies
public expenditure
developing countries
JEL: 
F4
E62
H62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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