Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90459
Authors: 
Dreher, Axel
Vreeland, James Raymond
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 78
Abstract: 
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
Subjects: 
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
JEL: 
O19
O11
F35
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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