Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90058
Authors: 
Rzepka, Sylvi
Tamm, Marcus
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7853
Abstract: 
The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifically, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.
Subjects: 
training
local labor markets
monopsony
JEL: 
I24
J24
J42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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