Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/90046 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7625
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further allows us to show that proposers use different equity rules and apply them in a self-serving manner. They tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payoff for them. Responders exhibit a similar pattern of behavior. Combined, these tendencies lead to high inefficiencies due to frequent rejections.
Schlagwörter: 
Outside Options
Equity Principle
Ultimatum Game
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
C91
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
433.02 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.