Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90004
Authors: 
Fuchs, William
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7758
Abstract: 
We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers.
Subjects: 
discretionary bonuses
feedback
signalling
JEL: 
D82
D83
D86
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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