Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89977
Authors: 
Guillaud, Elvire
Marx, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7569
Abstract: 
Insider-outsider theory suggests that in dual labour markets two groups have opposing preferences regarding protection against dismissals: insiders defend employment protection, because it increases their rents. Outsiders see it as a mobility barrier and demand deregulation. Similar divides are expected for unemployment benefits: as insiders and outsiders have diverging unemployment risks, they should demand different levels of protection. Although these views are influential in the political economy debate, there is little empirical research on the effect of contract types on social and labour market policy preferences. We use a novel data set collected in the most recent presidential contest in France, which combines detailed information on respondents' employment status with questions measuring attitudes towards dismissal regulation and other labour market policies. Going beyond insider-outsider theory, we argue and show empirically that the effect of membership in either segment is moderated by the employment situation in workers' occupation.
Subjects: 
employment protection
insider-outsider theory
political preferences
France
single employment contract
JEL: 
J08
J41
K31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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