Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89948 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7561
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
Schlagwörter: 
electoral rules
policy volatility
regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
H72
D72
C14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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