Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89948
Authors: 
Bordignon, Massimo
Nannicini, Tommaso
Tabellini, Guido
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7561
Abstract: 
We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
Subjects: 
electoral rules
policy volatility
regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
H72
D72
C14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
954.64 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.