Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89889
Authors: 
McGee, Andrew
McGee, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7759
Abstract: 
Modeling the incentive effects of competitions among employees for promotions or financial rewards, economists have largely ignored the effects of competition on effort provision once the competition is finished. In a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition outcomes affect the provision of post-competition effort. We find that subjects who lose arbitrarily decided competitions choose lower subsequent effort levels than subjects who lose competitions decided by their effort choices. We explore the preferences underlying this behavior and show that subjects' reactions are related to their preferences for meritocratic outcomes.
Subjects: 
tournaments
counterproductive behavior
promotions
experiment
JEL: 
C90
J30
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.11 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.