Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89827
Authors: 
Charness, Gary
Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
Lacomba, Juan A.
Lagos, Francisco
Pérez, José María
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7802
Abstract: 
This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers' performance. Moreover, the relative effect of discrimination in relation to decision rights is larger than in relation to wage. We find these treatment effects with both stated effort and a real-effort task, suggesting that both approaches may yield similar results.
Subjects: 
delegation
gift-exchange
experiment
JEL: 
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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