Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89776
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4541
Abstract: 
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
Subjects: 
public project
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
JEL: 
C72
C92
D63
H44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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