Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89765
Authors: 
Bordignon, Massimo
Gamalerio, Matteo
Turati, Gilberto
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4459
Abstract: 
In a career-concern model of politics with endogenous candidacy and different types of politicians, following a decentralization reform, politicians with different skills are elected in municipalities characterized by different levels of autonomous resources. As an effect, consumer welfare increases only, or mainly, in richer municipalities. We test these predictions by exploiting the differentiated reduction in Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Italian municipalities, due to the strong difference in the tax base, following the decentralization reforms of the '90s. Results strongly support our predictions and are robust to several alternative stories.
Subjects: 
decentralization
vertical fiscal imbalance
quality of politicians
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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