Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89729
Authors: 
Grimsrud, Kristine
Rosendahl, Knut Einar
Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid
Tsygankova, Marina
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4579
Abstract: 
In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition, both the resource rent and current prices influence a large resource owner’s optimal supply. New information regarding future market conditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current supply. Bleaker demand prospects tend to accelerate resource extraction. A more pessimistic outlook for future demand may, however, slow down the early resource extraction of producers with sufficiently large resource stocks and thus more limited resource rent, because the supply from these producers is driven more by current market considerations than by changes in the resource rent. As producers with relatively smaller resource stocks accelerate their supply in response to bleaker demand prospects, producers with sufficiently large resource stocks will reduce their current supply. A numerical model of the European gas market illustrates that the effect of the shale gas revolution is an accelerated supply by most gas producers, but a reduced supply by Russia who loses market shares even before the additional gas enters the market.
Subjects: 
resource extraction
Cournot competition
European gas market
JEL: 
Q31
Q33
Q42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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