Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89719 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4546
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores how a principal with time-inconsistent preferences invests optimally in technology or capital. If the current principal prefers her future self to save more, she can increase current investments complementary to future savings and decrease investments in the strategic substitutes, for example. To characterize the principal's choices they are compared to a market equilibrium where the investors are private agents. Each investing agent applies the same discount factors as do the principal and he obtains full property rights to the future returns. With geometric discounting, there would be no need to regulate (subsidize/tax) these agents. With time-inconsistent preferences, however, the current principal benefits from subsidizing investments in green capital (complementary to future savings) and tax investments in substitute capital such as brown technology and even adaptation technology. The paper can thus compare policies for different types of investments at the same level in the production hierarchy, but investments at different levels are also compared. With quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the optimal subsidy is unrelated to this level. With discount rates that are strictly decreasing in relative time, however, upstream investments (needed for downstream investments) will optimally be subsidized at a higher rate. When applied to environmental policy, the paper provides a new rationale for subsidizing green (and taxing brown) technology unrelated to the traditional motivation emphasizing public good aspects.
Schlagwörter: 
time inconsistency
hyperbolic discounting
commitment
investments
R&D
green technology
investment policy
environmental policy
climate change
JEL: 
D99
H43
H23
Q55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
239.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.